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HARMLESS ERROR RULE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JUDICIAL POWER -
HARMILESS ERROR
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
The application of the various state harmless error rules in state
criminal cases in which federal constitutional rights are violated
has been a difficult and confusing task. In the past, courts, when
faced with the question of harmless error, have been unable to re-
solve such difficult issues as whether state or federal standards are
to govern and whether harmless error is in fact possible when a fed-
eral constitutional right has been violated.
In Chapman v. Californi the Supreme Court has settled these
issues by creating a new harmless error rule to be applied whenever
a right protected by the United States Constitution has been denied
in a state criminal proceeding. Petitioners were convicted in a Cali-
fornia court of murdering a bartender. At trial, the district attorney
commented upon their failure to testify, punctuating his argument
to the jury with numerous references to their silence. The trial
judge then charged the jury that it could draw inferences of guilt
from petitioners' failure to testify.'
Shortly after trial, but before the case had been considered on
appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Griffin v. Califor-
nWia and held that comment upon a defendant's failure to testify
penalized the exercise of his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination.4 On the subsequent appeal of petitioners' case, the
California Supreme Court admitted that the petitioners were denied
their fifth amendment right in view of the holding in Griffin.
Nevertheless, it affirmed the conviction by applying the California
constitution's harmless error provision which forbids reversal un-
less "the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."5 In Chapman, the United
States Supreme Court rejected this test, reversed the conviction, and
formulated its own test - before the violation of a federal right
can be ruled harmless, the state must sustain the burden of proving
1386 U.S. 18 (1967).
21d. at 19.
8380 U.s. 609 (1965).
4 Id. at 613. The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was made bind-
ing upon the states by its being incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
5 386 U.S. at 20.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
conviction.'
Before the new test posited by the Supreme Court can be ex-
amined, it is essential to place the harmless error rule in historical
context. As indicated by Professor Wigmore, the crux of the harm-
less error controversy has been whether rules of evidence are a mere
means to the ascertainment of truth or are themselves an end, to be
followed sometimes at the expense of the truth.' Although Wig-
more preferred the former view,8 courts in the majority of American
jurisdictions ultimately chose the latter. The "Orthodox English
Rule," that error was harmless "unless truth had thereby not been
reached,"9 gave way in the 1830's to the "Exchequer Rule,"'10 which
considers error as a ground for automatic reversal even though the
error does not cause the verdict to be inaccurate or untruthful.
Though Wigmore termed the results of this rule "lamentable,"" it
is the prevailing rule today, provided the error contributed to the
disposition of the case. As the Supreme Court itself has stated,
"[t]he question, is not were they [the jury] right in their judgment,
regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather
what effect the error had . . . upon the jury's decision.' 21 How-
ever, as to federal rights violated in state trials, the criteria for deter-
mining whether the error contributed to the result has remained a
source of confusion until Chapman.
In Chapman, a majority of the Court cited Fahy v. Connecticut3
to refute the suggestion that all trial errors which violate the Con-
stitution necessitate reversal.'4 Although prior cases had held cer-
tain constitutional rights to be so basic to a fair trial that their viola-
tion can never be considered harmless,8 the Court concluded that:
"there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
6 Id. at 24. It should be noted that Chapman only applies after error has been estab-
lished and does not affect state procedures which merely shift the burden of proof to
the defendant as to a specific issue. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
7 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 365 (3d ed. 1940).
8Id. at 369, 370.
9 Id. at 365.
10ld. at 367.
11Id. at 370.
12 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
'3 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
14 386 U.S. at 24.
15 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (impartial judge).
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particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may
... be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the
conviction."" Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the viola-
tion of all or certain constitutional rights constitutes automatic re-
versible error. The majority did hold, however, that the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
to the conviction."
In so ruling, the Chapman Court asserted that it was doing noth-
ing new,'" but only adhering to its ruling in Fahy v. Connecticut, in
which it stated that: "We are not concerned here with whether
there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have
been convicted without the evidence complained of. The question
is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the conviction."' 9  In Chap-
man, the Court believed that the newly adopted test "will provide a
more workable standard, although achieving the same result as that
aimed at in our Fahy case."2 Actually, the Court went far beyond
its holding in Fahy, which neither explicitly put the burden upon the
state to prove its contentions beyond a reasonable doubt nor ex-
plicitly displaced the various state harmless error rules with a uni-
form federal rule with respect to violations of federally protected
rights.2 In any event the Court's ruling in Fahy and its broad ex-
tension in Chapman has significantly changed the law in this area.
Before these cases the federal courts were divided as to whether they
were bound to follow the decisions of the highest state courts in the
absence of a state statute regulating trial error.22 A fortiori, it is
less likely that federal courts would ignore a state supreme court's
decision in the face of a directly applicable state statute as was pres-
ent in Chapman.2" In practical effect Chapman completely destroys
10 386 U.S. at 22. In its opinion the Court offered no examples of this possibility.
In a concurring opinion, Air. Justice Stewart argued that constitutional rights are not
fungible goods subject to a uniform rule and that, though some constitutional violations
might be subject to the Court's harmless error rule, violations of Griffin could never
be found harmless under any test. Id. at 44. He concluded that "a rule of automatic
reversal would seem best calculated to prevent dear violations of Griffin .... Id. at
45.
.7Id. at 24.
18 Id.
19 375 U.S. at 86-87.
20 386 U.S. at 24.
21375 U.S. at 86-87.
22 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 6b.
23 CAL. CONST. art VI, 4 V:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the
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the applicability of state harmless error rules to state convictions
tainted by the violation of rights.2"
The troubling aspect of Chapman, however, is the Court's jus-
tification for applying the new rule to the states. In the past the
Court has carefully distinguished its broad supervisory power over
the federal courts from its more limited power over state courts. 5
As the United States Constitution dictates, the latter power is con-
fined to issues involving constitutional provisions binding upon the
states. In Ker v. California,"8 the Court stated in reply to the de-
fendant's argument that the federal standard adopted in Miller v.
United States27 applied to the states:
And, although the standard of reasonableness is the same under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our fed-
eral system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inad-
missible because of our supervisory powers over federal courts
and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States
Constitution. 2
More recently the Court explicitly acknowledged the use of its
federal supervisory power in holding that no sentence exceeding 6
ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection
of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error
as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error com-
plained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964) which provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." FED. R_ CRIM. P. 52 (a) provides that "Any error, defect, irregularity or vari-
ance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
24 Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, recognized this fact and stated that the new rule
"commits this court to a case-by-case examination to determine the extent to which we
think unconstitutional comment... influenced the outcome of a particular trial. This
burdensome obligation is one that we here are hardly qualified to discharge." 386 U.S.
at 44. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, was even more specific: "This decision ... im-
poses on this Court, in cases coming here directly from state courts, and . . . in cases aris-
ing on habeas corpus, the duty of determining for themselves whether a constitutional
error was harmless. In all but insubstantial instances, this will entail a de novo assess-
ment of the entire state trial record." Id. at 56.25 Compare Benand v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), with Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952) and Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Compare
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), with Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301(1958). See also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214 (1950); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
26 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
27 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
28 374 U.S. at 33. Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed, contending that the standard of
reasonableness under the fourth and 14th amendments were not the same; he considered
the underlying test of the fourth amendment to be that of "fundamental fairness." Id.
at 44.
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months may be imposed in a federal criminal contempt case unless
the sentencing court observes the defendant's right to trial by jury.29
The supervisory power has traditionally been used to formulate
rules of evidence for federal courts.8" But in all these instances
the Court made it abundantly clear that on constitutional issues it
was using its supervisory power as opposed to its power over the
states through the 14th amendment.
In some cases involving the recently developed theory of pe-
numbral rights, however, the Court has not explicitly indicated the
source and nature of its power. At times the distinction between
the Court's supervisory power over the federal courts as opposed to
its more limited constitutional power over the states appears to have
vanished. No doubt this is partly due to the nature of the penum-
bral theory itself, which is somewhat nebulous in that implicit con-
stitutional policy is being utilized to give explicit constitutional
rights more life, meaning, and substance.81 Yet, Mr. Justice
Holmes recognized the importance of the penumbral approach
when he stated: "I fully agree [with Mr. Justice Brandeis] that
Courts are apt to err in sticking too closely to the words of a law
where those words import a policy that goes beyond them.""2
It is therefore understandable that some commentators have
been more critical of the rationale than of the result in cases which
have employed the penumbral theory in order to make constitu-
tional rights meaningful. 8 The "mystical" status of the exclusion-
ary doctrine of Weeks v. United States8" dearly illustrates this point.
Although the Court held the fourth amendment binding upon the
states via the due process clause of the 14th amendment in Wolf
v. Colorado,85 it nevertheless held that the Weeks exclusionary
rule did not bind the states,"8 and it was assumed by scholars
that the rule was based upon the Court's supervisory power only.
29 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966).
80 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963); see, e.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291
U.S. 7 (1934); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
81 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
32 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
83 Blackshield, Constitutionalism and Comstockery, 14 KAN. L REv. 403 (1966).
In criticizing the Court's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the
author states: 'The somewhat skimpy reasoning by which these hints and echoes were
made to yield up a generalized constitutional privacy right is the main ground for dis-
satisfaction with Griswold ...... Blackshield, supra at 432.
84 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
85 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
86 338 U.S. at 25.
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As the Court in Wolf stated, the Weeks rule "was not derived from
the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment .... The de-
cision was a matter of judicial implication."37  The Court went on
to say that "problems... would be presented should Congress under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment undertake to .. .make the
Weeks doctrine binding upon the states."38  Mr. Justice Black con-
curred in the opinion: "But I agree with what appears to be the
plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusion-
ary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judi-
cially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."39
Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented because they felt that the
Weeks rule was a fourth amendment requirement."
Twelve years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,4 the Court overruled
Wolf and bound the states to apply the exclusionary rule in order
to make the fourth amendment a more meaningful right. In so
holding, the Court stated not only that the rule was a constitutional
mandate, but also that the Court had always considered it to be
such. "There are in the cases of this Court some passing references
to the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and
unequivocal language of Weeks - and its later paraphrase in Wolf
- to the effect that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, re-
mains entirely undisturbed."4  It appears inconceivable that the
Weeks rule was considered to be of constitutional origin before
Mapp. As already noted,4" the Court in Wolf clearly seemed to
have construed the rule as being anything but a constitutional man-
date. Thus, the source of the Court's power in the Mapp decision
is not at all clear.
The recent case of Parker v. Gladden44 is another illustration of
the Court's failure to define dearly the source of its power. In this
a7 Id. at 28.
38Id. at 33.
39 Id. at 39-40. Mr. Justice Black's limitation of the sweep of the fourth amend-
ment, as expressed in Wolf, caused him to rely on the fourth and fifth amendments to-
gether when he changed his position in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961).
40 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
41 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42Id. at 649.
43 Text accompanying notes 35-41 supra. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965), where the Court held that its decision in Mapp to incorporate the Weeks
rule into the fourth amendment was not to apply retroactively. Since this was the first
criminal case in which a constitutional ruling was given prospective effect only, it lends
support to the contention that the Court had not always considered the Weeks rule to
be of constitutional origin.
44 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
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case a bailiff, while watching over the jury in an Oregon state crim-
inal case, made remarks prejudicial to the defendant. Ten of the
jurors swore that they had not heard the remarks. Although Ore-
gon law permits conviction by the affirmative vote of only 10
jurors, the Court reversed the conviction: "The State says that 10
of the jurors testified that they had not heard the statements of the
bailiff .... In any event, petitioner was entitled to be tried by 12,
not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors."45  The
Court appears to be saying that, although state law may constitu-
tionally allow conviction by less than a 12-juror vote, all jurors
must be impartial initially. Yet the language of the Court goes far
beyond this point; the following part of its opinion suggests that it
was applying the broad sixth amendment right to trial by jury to
the states as well: "We believe that the statements ... are controlled
by the command of the sixth amendment .... It guarantees that
'the accused shall enjoy the right to a ...trial, by an impartial
jury... and be confronted with the witnesses against him.... ,46 In
view of the Court's prior holding in Maxwell v. Dow,4 7 that the to-
tality of the sixth amendment is not binding upon the states, and the
fact that Maxwell was not mentioned in Parker, it must be assumed
that the Court did not really mean what it said but that only the
more limited sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and the
right of confrontation are applicable to the states. Also, if this re-
sult were constitutionally required, why was a Louisiana state case
cited to bind Oregon courts? If, instead, this was not a constitu-
tional mandate, but merely a discretionary exercise of supervisory
power over federal courts, then the Court was powerless to bind the
state of Oregon. This is another instance in which the Court, in
purportedly adding meaning and life to the first 10 amendments,
has neglected to define the source of its power and 'has introduced
confusion as to the status of the sixth amendment.
In Chapman the source of the Court's power is as unclear as it
was in Mapp and Parker. Here the court briefly justified its exer-
cise of power over the states in creating the new harmless error rule:
Whether a conviction ... should stand when a State has failed to
accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as
451d. at 366, where the Court refers to State v. Murray, 164 La. 883, 887, 114 So.
721, 723 (1927).
46 385 U.S. at 366. This language suggests that the sixth amendment right to a
jury trial be incorporated into the 14th amendment. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
47 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
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much of a federal question as what particular federal constitution-
al provisions themselves mean.... [Wlith faithfulness to the con-
stitutional union of the States, we cannot leave to the States the
formulation of the authoritative laws ... designed to protect ...
federally guaranteed rights .. .. [The right ...to be silent -
expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself - is a federal
right which, in the absence of appropriate congressional action,
it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.48
Again, the Court appears to be making an expressly created right
more meaningful. Yet, in its own words, it does so "in the absence
of appropriate congressional action,"49 without dearly stating, as it
had done in Wolf v. Colorado, that its reliance was being placed on
the due process clause of the 14th amendment."0 The Court's lan-
guage thus appears to make its power more supervisory than con-
stitutional.
Perhaps the Court is saying that the absence of appropriate con-
gressional action necessitated the judicial formulation of the new
rule through the exercise of constitutional rather than supervisory
power, and that the vehicle for the decision was the penumbral
rights theory. " Yet, this conclusion is reached, not in view of the
Court's language, but in spite of it. Whatever the thinking of the
Court may have been, it should have been set forth more clearly.
Recent cases like Mapp, Parker, and Chapman, which have
blurred the once-clear distinction between the constitutional and
supervisory powers of the Supreme Court, may have stemmed from
the exercise of a new, third power of the Court - a result of the
selective incorporation of the first 10 amendments into the 14th.
It is important to note that the present determination of the Court
to give the constitutional rights more life, meaning, and substance,52
48 386 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
50 338 U.S. at 33; see text accompanying note 38 supra.
Mr. Justice Harlan points to the troublesome language in Chapman in his dissenting
opinion:
The ... rule ... flows from what is seemingly regarded as a power inherent
in the Court's constitutional responsibilities rather than from the Constitution
itself. The Court appears to acknowledge that other harmless-error formu-
lations would be constitutionally permissible. It certainly indicates that Con-
gress ... could impose a different formulation.
I regard the Court's assumption of what amounts to a general supervisory
power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts as a startling
constitutional development that is wholly out of keeping with our federal
system and completely unsupported by the Fourteenth Amendment where the
source of such a power must be found. 386 U.S. at 46-47.
51 Text accompanying note 32 supra; cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966). See also the quote from the majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), as in the text accompaning note 38 supra.
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and to check offensive police practices that detract from such ef-
forts,5" had previously been expressed by the Court in the explicit
exercise of its supervisory power before selective incorporation be-
came the vogue.5 The intent of the Court, as expressed in its 1943
opinion in McNabb v. United States,55 sounds much like the intent
expressed by the present Court:56
For, while the power of this Court to undo convictions in state
courts is limited to the enforcement of those "fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice" the scope of our reviewing power
over ...federal courts is not confined to the ascertainment of
Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision . .. in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence.57
For this procedural requirement checks resort to those repre-
hensible practices known as the "third degree" which ... still find
their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of
secret interrogations .... It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy
view of law enforcement.58
It is also important to note that the Court recently has enlarged the
protection of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments specifically in
order to combat offensive police practices. The Court, in addition,
has applied many of these decisions prospectively only on the
ground that the offensive practices struck down did not affect the
process of guilt determination.59  In Stovall v. Denno ° the Court
recently held that a constitutional rule of criminal procedure was to
apply prospectively even though the guilt-determining process had
been tainted by violation of constitutional rights:
5 2 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); text accompaning note
32 supra.
53 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
55318 U.S. 332 (1943).
56 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 7 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
58 Id. at 344.
59 See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), giving prospective applica-
tion to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Tehan v. Short, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), giv-
ing prospective application to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), giving prospective application to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
60388 U.S. 293 (1967). Here the court prospectively applied the rule set forth
in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), that a pretrial lineup at which an
accused is exhibited to identifying wimesses without benefit of counsel was a critical
stage of criminal prosecution and failure to provide counsel constituted a denial of the
sixth amendment rights.
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The extent to which a condemned practice infects the integrity of
the truth-determining process at trial is a "question of probabili-
ties." . . . Such probabilities must in turn be weighed against the
prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of
retroactivity upon the administration of justice.61
This greater concern for the administration of justice than for the
right of an individual to an untainted mode of guilt determination
seems much more justifiable if it is assumed that the Court is rely-
ing on its supervisory power. If, on the other hand, the Court is
relying in these decisions on its limited power to bind the states to
observe constitutionally guaranteed rights, its subsequent prospec-
tive application of those rights is much less understandable. As
Mr. Justice Black stated, "I do not believe... [the Court] has the
power, by weighing 'countervailing interests,' to legislate a time-
table by which the Constitution's provisions shall become effec-
tive., 6
2
This writer suggests that although the values of the Court ba-
sically have remained the same, the selective incorporation of most
of the first 10 amendments into the 14th has blunted the once-sharp
distinction between supervisory and constitutional power.a The
penumbral rights theory and the selective incorporation technique
seem to have wedged a third source of power - a twilight zone -
between the distinctly supervisory and distinctly constitutional power
of the Court.
In summary, the Chapman case appears significant for various
reasons. First, it creates a new federal harmless error rule and casts
aside the various harmless error rules of the 50 states wherever a
federal right has been violated. 4 In requiring the application of
this new rule in state cases initially, the Court seems to have re-
61 388 U.S. at 298.
62 Id. at 304.
63 But see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the Court, after the fourth
amendment had been incorporated into the 14th, explicitly recognized the supervisory-
constitutional power distinction in reviewing a state case involving the fourth amend-
ment. This writer feels that the effect of using the selective incorporation technique
in binding both the states and the federal government to the same test with respect
to most of the first 10 amendments, may have caused the Court to unconsciously over-
look, on occasion, the importance of defining the exact source of its power. Since states
are now bound by these amendments, their "stake" in the Court's strict observance of the
nature of its power is much greater. Because of this, the Court should be more diligent
in defining the source of its power and in respecting the constitutional-supervisory dis-
tinction.
6 4 Note 24 supra & accompanying text. As California itself recognized in petition-
ing the Court to rehear the Chapman case, "this Court has cast aside the various harm-
less error rules hitherto adopted by some fifty states as well as the federal government."
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 2, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
